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Abstract
The decision rules in simulation models purport to describe decision-
making behavior as it is and not as it should optimally be. Without the
criterion of optimality to judge the appropriateness of a decision rule,
simulation modelers must rely on empirical confirmation of the structure of
their models. In models of small organizations, traditional social science
methods may be used. But these methods are infeasible in models of larger
systems such as industries or the macroeconomy. This paper shows how direct
experiment can be used to confirm or disconfirm the decision rules in
simulation models. Direct experiment uses interactive gaming in which human
subjects play a role in the system being modeled. The subjects play the game
in the same physical and institutional context assumed in the model, and are
given the same information set, but are free to make decisions any way they
wish. The behavior of the subject can then be directly compared against the
behavior produced by the assumed decision rules of the model. An example is
described in detail and the correspondence of the experiment to reality is
discussed.
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TESTING BEHAVIORAL SIMULATION MODELS BY DIRECT EXPERIMENT
The problem of testing behavioral simulation models
The utility of simulation models depends on the confidence the model
users vest in the model. The model must represent the physical and
institutional structure of the system and the decisionmaking procedures used
by the actors with enough accuracy for the purpose at hand. Accurately
portraying the 'physics' of the system is relatively straightforward. In
contrast, discovering and representing the decision rules of the actors is
subtle and difficult. In models of small organizations such as a family,
community, or corporation, traditional social science techniques can be used
to gather primary data on decisionmaking behavior. Interviews, surveys,
participant observation, and other techniques can reveal the networks of
information flow, organizational structures, and decisionmaking heuristics
necessary to construct a useful model.
Such techniques are of less use to the analyst interested in larger
systems such as an entire industry or the macroeconomy. Fieldwork involving a
significant sample of firms is prohibitively expensive and time consuming.
Consistent aggregation is difficult. The traditional alternative has been to
draw on established organizational and economic theory to specify the model,
followed by estimation of the parameters and sensitivity tests. Econometric
estimation provides an obvious means to test the consistency of models with
past experience.
But these methods are unsatisfying to many economists and simulation
modelers alike. Data limitations and technical difficulties of identification
and estimation aside, econometrics is fundamentally unable to validate the
behavioral decision rules in simulation models because the data represent the
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'what' of decisions, not the 'why'. The numerical data used in estimation are
the result of decisionmaking, and do not in themselves reveal the motivation
for the decisions. As a result, econometrics has proven to be a rather dull
knife: it is often impossible to discriminate between radically divergent
theories using econometrics alone (Leamer 1983, Thurow 1983, Leontief 1982,
1971, Phelps-Brown 1972, Keynes 1939).
Of more importance, however, traditional neoclassical economic theory is
heavily based on the assumptions of rational behavior, optimization, and
equilibrium. Human behavior is assumed to be rational: decisions are guided
by the urge to maximize profits or utility; the information required to
successfully optimize is assumed to be available, usually freely, and often
including information about the true structure of the system (as in rational
expectations), about the future (as in intertemporal optimization models) and
about hypothetical situations (e.g. the productivity of untried combinations
of factor inputs). The economy is assumed to be in or near equilibrium nearly
all the time, and adjustment processes are usually assumed to be stable.1
The behavioral simulation modeler cannot accept such assumptions. As
Herbert Simon (1979, 510) declared in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech,
There can no longer be any doubt that the micro assumptions of the
theory--the assumptions of perfect rationality--are contrary to fact.
It is not a question of approximation; they do not even remotely
describe the processes that human beings use for making decisions in
complex situations.
The purpose of simulation models is to mimic the real system so that its
behavior can be anticipated or changed. Simulation models must therefore
portray decisionmaking behavior as it is, and not as it might be if decision-
makers were omniscient optimizers. The decisionmaking heuristics and
strategies people use, including their limitations and errors, must be
modeled.
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Bounded rationality and behavioral decision theory
An extensive body of theory and empirical data exists which documents the
strategies and heuristics people use in a wide variety of decisionmaking
contexts. The sources of this knowledge include organizational studies,
cognitive and social psychology, and other social sciences. Known generally
as Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), these studies emphasize bounded
rationality in human behavior. BDT focuses on identifying cognitive
limitations in the perception and processing of information and the
organizational strategies people devise to deal with these limitations
(Armstrong 1985, Hogarth 1980, Kahneman et al. 1982, Simon 1982). BDT not
only illuminates the way decisions are actually made, but documents a large
number of systematic deviations from objectively rational behavior. Many
heuristics lead to suboptimal or biased decisions in a wide variety of
settings. Common examples include the gambler's fallacy and the regression
fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). BDT shows that "people give more weight
to data that they consider causally related to a target object..." (Hogarth
1980, 42-43, emphasis in original). However, people are poor judges of
causality and correlation, and in controlled experiments systematically create
mental models at variance with the known situation. Ironically, most people,
including many professionals, consistently assert that their own performances
are immune from such pitfalls, are reluctant to abandon their mental models,
and selectively use hindsight to 'validate' their preconceptions.
BDT is useful in simulation for two reasons. First, bounded rationality
provides theoretical foundations for behavior that deviates from objective
rationality. Second, the empirical results of BDT research document the
heuristics people actually use, providing a data base for model development.
However, the empirical results of BDT are overwhelmingly micro-level. It is
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difficult to connect the results of BDT to the aggregate decision rules
typically used in simulation models. Compare, for example, the verbal
protocols and models described in Feigenbaum and Feldman 1963 or Ericsson and
Simon 1984 with the typical continuous simulation model. Protocols for
decisionmaking heuristics are usually given in the form of decision trees or
other discrete, event-oriented procedures such as the TOTE unit (Miller,
Galanter, and Pribram 1960). In contrast, a typical continuous simulation
decision rule for inventory management in a manufacturing firm might be:2
DPt = EOt + (DINVt-INVt)/TCI
where
DP = Desired Production (units/time) INV = Inventory (units)
EO = Expected Orders (units/time) DINV = Desired Inventory (units)
TCI = Time to Correct Inventory (time)
The continuous rule may be used to describe aggregate behavior for a firm or
industry. It is not intended as a literal statement of how production
decisions are made. Rather it is deemed to be an acceptable simplification.
The lumping of distributed but similar components, as in the aggregation of
stocks of different product lines and firms into a single measure of
inventory, is often cited as justification for assuming continuous decision
rules (Forrester 1961, Ch. 11). Such aggregation is justified as necessary if
a model is to remain small enough to be comprehensible, and thus useful. Yet
the inevitability of aggregation does not mean such aggregation is appro-
priate. (For informative discussion of the connection between representations
of feedback at the event level with continuous representations, see Richardson
1984). The production scheduling example, though simple, shows that methods
are needed to bridge the gap between the micro knowledge of individual
decisions and the macrobehavior of aggregate phenomena. Simulation has long
been touted as one such method, but its acceptance has been limited by the
III
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inability to relate the micro data to aggregate decision rules. Direct
experiment offers a useful method to bridge this gap.
Experimental economics
Direct experimental investigation of economic behavior has flowered over
the past two decades (for surveys, see Smith 1982a, Plott 1982; also Smith
1979, 1982b). Most of these experiments concern what Smith 1982a calls
microeconomic systems. These microworlds consist of an environment and an
institutional structure. The environment includes the number of agents
participating and their individual preferences, knowledge, and resource endow-
ments. The institutional structure of the experiment consists of a specified
language for interaction, resource allocation rules, cost imputation rules,
and adjustment process rules governing the beginning, transitions, and end of
the experiments. By manipulating both the environment and the institutional
arrangements, the experimenter creates controlled situations in order to test
hypotheses or elicit new data. Typical experiments investigate aspects of
price theory such as the number of buyers and sellers required to find compet-
itive equilibrium, test whether decisionmaking is conducted in accordance with
expected utility theory, and evaluate the efficiency of various institutions
such as different types of auctions. While many of these studies are
concerned with equilibrium or asymptotic results, a relative few studies are
primarily concerned with dynamic behavior (e.g. Plott and Wilde 1982, Garner
1982, Alker and Tanaka 1981, Williams 1979). As Shubik (1979, 354) notes:
When an economy is in equilibrium, the role of markets, financial
institutions and money tends to disappear. The institutions such as
organized markets, firms and banks are the carriers of process and a
major part of the information and communication flow of an economy.
In disequilibrium they appear clearly ....Many different institutions
may have the same static efficiency properties, but it is possible
that they manifest considerably different dynamic properties. The
questions concerning the selection of optimal...institutions in a
fully dynamic context have hardly been asked in a precise form, let
alone answered.
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Because experimental microeconomics must pay careful attention to the
institutional structure of the system, that is, to the procedural aspects of
decisionmaking, it is inherently dynamic and well suited to test the decision
rules of behavioral simulation models, even if they are not strictly
microeconomic in focus. The need for explicit specification and control of
the information set available to the actors and the rules of interaction and
exchange give the experimental method the flexibility required to test the
behavior of real people against the models of behavior assumed in
simulations.
Protocols for direct experiment to test simulation models
The structure of models considered for experimental testing can be
divided into two components: the physical and institutional structure on the
one hand, and the behavioral decision rules on the other. For example, the
physical and institutional assumptions in a model of a manufacturing firm
might include the aggregation of different product lines into a single
inventory of finished products from which orders are filled. Other
assumptions may be that there is a certain average lag required to produce
goods, that labor is the sole factor of production, that list prices are
announced publicly. The behavioral decision rules would include procedures
for determining production goals, workweek, hiring and layoffs, and changes in
prices. The design of the experiment will depend on which type of assumption
is to be tested. The discussion below focuses on tests of the decision rules.
Tests of the physical and institutional assumptions are considered in the
concluding section.
To test the decision rules of the model, the experimenter must ensure
that the human subjects are placed in the same physical and institutional
context assumed in the model. The purpose of such a test is to determine
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whether real people behave in the same way the model presumes them to behave,
given the physical structure and other aspects of the organizational setting.
Likewise, the behavioral decision rules in simulation models presume that
a certain information set is available at each decision point. The managers
of the firm in the example above may not know the demand schedule of the
customers, but only the past history of orders and prices. Behavioral
simulation models, in keeping with the theory of bounded rationality, often
presume that decisions are factored into subdecisions, and that the local
decisionmaking units may have access to or choose to use less than the full
set of available information (Morecroft 1983, 1985). Typically, decisions
would emphasize locally available, relatively certain, and relatively new
information over distant, uncertain, or dated information.
The information available to the human subject must be carefully
controlled. Several designs are possible here, depending on the purpose of
the experiment. One can deliberately restrict the information available to
the human subjects to the set assumed to be actually used in the model, so as
to see if the live agents process that information in the same way as presumed
in the model. Alternatively, one may give the live subjects more information
than is presumed to be used in the model, and test whether they utilize the
same subset of the available information.
The decision rules in behavioral simulation models also impute
preferences to the decisionmakers. These preferences may not take the form of
explicit cost or utility functions, but may appear as a set of subgoals which
the decisionmaker strives to satisfy. For example, the production model
described above may assume that desired inventory is determined by a desired
coverage ratio of expected orders. Implicit in this subgoal is a loss
function which assumes costs arise from excess of deficient inventory
7
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coverage. The experiment must ensure that subjects are faced with the same
underlying preferences and costs the modelbuilder presumes to be operating.
For example, to motivate players to balance inventory and desired inventory,
the experimenter might create a cost function which specifies losses for
excess or deficient inventory, and reward players for minimizing their costs.
The cost function approach is taken in the "Beer Distribution Game" (Sterman
1984).
If the experimenter can control for the institutional structure,
information availability, and preferences assumed in the model, then the
resulting behavior of live subjects can be directly compared to the behavior
produced by the decision rule of the model. The human subjects are placed in
the same physical and institutional structure, given the same information set,
and strive for the same goals as the simulated decisionmakers. But whereas
the simulation model contains an explicit rule for processing the information
to yield a decision, the subjects of the experiment are free to make their
decisions any way they wish. The comparison of simulated and experimental
behavior thus provides a potential disconfirmation of the model's decision
rules (Bell and Senge 1980). A strong caveat must be issued here, however.
The correspondence of experimental and simulated behavior does not validate
the model--after all, any of the assumptions about physical structure,
information availability, and preferences may be false. Additional
experiments are necessary to test these assumptions. A successful outcome
shows only that given the institutional structure, real people behave the same
way the model presumes them to behave.
An example: A behavioral model of capital investment cycles
The example presented here involves a model of aggregate investment
behavior. The original simulation model (Sterman 1985) showed how the capital
11
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investment decisions of individual firms could lead to long-period cycles in
the economy. A simple model of a capital-producing firm was developed. The
decision rules of the model were shown to be locally rational through partial
model tests. That is, the individual decision rules behaved rationally in
isolation. The response of the partial model to unanticipated shocks was
smooth, stable, and appropriate. Next, a macroeconomic linkage (the capital
investment accelerator) was introduced. The accelerator represents the fact
that capital is an input to its own production. When the demand for capital
rises, capital-producing firms must expand their own capacity, further
increasing the total demand for capital (cf Frisch 1933, Samuelson 1939,
Goodwin 1951). Introducing the accelerator into the model caused large
amplitude limit cycles to emerge (Figure 1). The model showed that locally
rational decisionmaking by individual firms could lead to macroeconomic
instabilities when the firms were coupled through the accelerator mechanism.
The physical and institutional structure assumed in the model is
extremely simple (Figure 2). Orders for the firm's product accumulate in the
backlog, which is depleted by production. Production is determined by
capacity and capacity utilization. Utilization is a nonlinear function of the
ratio of desired production to capacity: when desired output exceeds
capacity, production is constrained by capacity; when desired output is less
than capacity, utilization is gradually cut back. Capacity is determined by
the capital stock and the (constant) capital/output ratio. Capital stock is
augmented by acquisitions and diminished by discards. The average lifetime of
capital is assumed to be constant and the discard process exponential. Orders
for capital are received after a delay representing the construction process.
Hence orders for capital accumulate in the supply line (the backlog of
unfilled orders for capital, including units under construction). The supply
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line is diminished when construction is completed and the capital enters the
productive stock.
The key decision rule in the model is the capital order decision. The
firm must decide how much capital to order each time period given available
information such as the current backlog, past order rates, capacity, capacity
on order, and the capital acquisition delay. The assumed order decision is
decomposed into several blocks of equations:
COt tCOFt (1)
COF t= OFO<fCOFma x, f '>0 (2)
ICOFt = (CDt+CCt+CSLt)/Ct
where
CO = capital order rate (capital units/year)
C = capital stock (units)
COF = capital order fraction (fraction/year)
ICOF= indicated capital order fraction (fraction/year)
CD = capital discard rate (capital units/year)
CC = correction to orders from capital stock (capital units/year)
CSL = correction to orders from supply line (capital units/year).
Three motivations for ordering capital are assumed: first, to replace
discards; second, to correct any discrepancy between the desired and actual
capital stock; and third, to correct any discrepancy between the desired and
actual supply line. The sum of these three pressures, as a fraction of the
existing capital stock, defines the indicated capital order fraction ICOF.
The actual order fraction COF is a nonlinear function of the indicated order
fraction. For indicated order fractions between 5%/year and 25%/year,
COF=ICOF. In extreme circumstances, however, the indicated capital order
fraction may take on unreasonable values. For example, an extreme excess of
capacity could cause ICOF to be negative. But since gross investment must be
positive, COF asymptotically approaches zero as ICOF drops below 5%/year.
Similarly, to prevent the order fraction from taking on unreasonably large
10
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values, it is assumed that the maximum capital order fraction COF is
max
30%/year. The limit reflects physical constraints to rapid expansion such as
labor and materials bottlenecks, financial constraints and organizational
stress.
CSLt = (DSLt-SLt)/TASL (4)
DSL t = CD t*PCATt (5)
PCATt = CATt (6)
where
DSL = desired supply line (capital units),
SL = supply line (capital units),
TASL = time to adjust supply line (years),
PCAT = perceived capital acquisition time (years),
CAT = capital acquisition time (years).
Firms strive to eliminate discrepancies between the desired and actual
supply lines within the time to adjust supply line TASL. To ensure an
appropriate acquisition rate, firms must maintain a supply line proportional
to the delay they face in acquiring capital. If the acquisition time rises,
firms must plan for and order new capital farther ahead, increasing the
required supply line. For simplicity, the perceived capital acquisition time
is assumed to equal the actual acquisition time.
CCt = (DCt-Ct)/TAC (7)
DC = R~f fI2t1)C1, (8)Dt RCf 2(ICt/RC), ' f)=, f2(1)= f2'> f2 <O, (8)
ICt = IPCt*COR (9)
where
DC = desired capital (capital units),
TAC = time to adjust capital (years),
RC = reference capital (capital units),
IC = indicated capital (capital units),
IPC = indicated production capacity (units/year),
COR = capital/output ratio (years).
Like the supply line correction, firms attempt to correct discrepancies
between desired and actual capital stock over a period of time given by the
11
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time to adjust capital. Desired capital is nonlinearly related to the
indicated capital stock, which is the stock needed to provide the indicated
production capacity IPC. Indicated production capacity is the capacity judged
necessary to meet expected demand. Diminishing returns to capital are assumed
to limit capital expansion when IC becomes large relative to the initial
equilibrium capital stock RC.
IPCt = EOt + CBt (10)
CBt = (Bt-IBt)/TAB (11)
IBt = NND*EOt (12)
where
EO = expected orders (units/year),
CB = correction from backlog (units/year),
B = backlog (units),
IB = indicated backlog (units),
TAB = time to adjust backlog (years),
NDD = normal delivery delay (years).
Indicated production capacity reflects the capacity the sector judges
necessary both to fill expected orders and adjust the backlog of unfilled
orders to an appropriate level. The speed with which the sector strives to
correct discrepancies between the actual and indicated backlog is determined
by the time to adjust backlog. TAB represents management's sensitivity to
abnormal delivery delays. Indicated backlog is the backlog required to supply
the expected order rate within the normal delivery delay.
(d/dt)EOt = (ORt-EOt)/TAO (13)
where
EO = expected orders (units/year),
OR = order rate (units/year),
TAO = time to average orders (years).
The expected order rate represents the sector's forecast of demand.
Adaptive expectations are assumed. Incoming orders are smoothed because it
12
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takes time for firms to decide that an unanticipated change in demand is
lasting enough to warrant capacity expansion. Smoothing filters out short-
term noise in demand, providing a more certain measure of long-run demand than
the raw order rate and preventing wild swings in investment by allowing the
backlog to buffer the system from the short-term variability of demand.
First-order exponential smoothing is assumed for the averaging process. The
smoothing time is given by the time to average orders TAO.
The assumed capital order decision represented by eq. 1-13 is typical of
continuous simulation models. The rule deliberately abstracts from the
discrete nature of individual decisions. The formulation is intended to
capture the aggregate result of the investment decisions made by many firms.
Orders are expressed as a continuous function of various inputs. Those inputs
are restricted to information that is locally available to the decisionmakers
(e.g. backlog, capacity). Information an individual firm is unable or
unlikely to have, such as the value of the equilibrium capacity stock, is not
used. The firm's forecasting process is rather simple. Finally, the
formulation includes appropriate nonlinearities so that it is robust in
extreme conditions: gross investment is constrained to be positive and
finite; desired capital is assumed to reflect diminishing returns. The
parameters assumed in the decision rule were chosen to be consistent with
survey and econometric evidence reported in various studies (Mayer 1960; Coen
1975; Senge 1978, 1980).
Protocol for the experiment
To test the correspondence of the model to real behavior, an interactive
simulation 'game' was developed. In the game, human subjects play the role of
the manager of the capital producing sector and are responsible for making
investment decisions. The structure of the game, the physical and
j_lllll___l______l_·-_-__ll_·l_··-·P
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institutional context in which the player makes decisions, is identical to the
original model. The player is given the same information set available in the
original simulation model. The only difference between the original
simulation model and the game is the fact that investment decisions are
specified in the latter by the player and in the former by the decision rule
described above.4
The simulation game is described fully in Sterman and Meadows 1985. It
can be played manually or on a personal computer. In the PC version, the game
board is displayed on the screen, showing the current values of variables such
as capacity, desired production, orders, etc. (Figure 3). The players enter
their order decision for the current period in the box marked 'New Orders-
Capital Sector'. Using animation, the flows of orders, shipments, and
depreciation of the capital stock are graphically displayed on the screen.
The current values of all the system variables are displayed on the
screen at all times. Players have the option of plotting and/or printing the
entire history of the game to date at any time before entering their order
decision. Thus perfect and complete information is available to the player.
The only unknown in the system is the future order stream placed by the goods
sector.
The player, or team of players, takes the role of manager for the entire
capital-producing sector of the economy. Time is divided into two-year
periods. At the beginning of each period, orders for capital are received
from two sources: the goods sector and the capital sector itself. Orders for
capital arriving from the goods sector are exogenous, as in the simulation
model. Orders for capital from the capital sector are determined by the
player. Orders placed by both sectors accumulate in the corresponding halves
of the rectangle containing the supply line of unfilled orders. The sum of
III
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the supply lines of the two sectors is desired production for the current two
year period. Production itself is the lesser of desired production or
production capacity. Capacity is determined by the capital stock of the
sector. Capital stock is decreased by depreciation and increased by shipments
out of the supply line. Depreciation is 10% of capacity each period, corre-
sponding to an average lifetime of 20 years. If capacity is inadequate to
meet demand fully, available production of capital is allocated between the
capital and goods sector in proportion to their respective backlogs. For
example, if the backlog of the capital sector were 500 and the backlog of the
goods sector were 1000, desired production would be 1500. If capacity were
only 1200, production would be 1200 and the fraction of demand satisfied would
be 1200/1500=80%. Thus 400 units would be shipped to the capital sector and
800 would be shipped to the goods sector. Any unfilled orders remain in their
respective supply lines to be filled in future periods. In the example, 100
units would remain in the supply line of the capital sector and 200 would
remain in the supply line of the goods sector.
Note that there is only one decision in the game that is left to the
discretion of the player--how much new capital to order. The player's goal in
making these decisions is to minimize the total score for the simulation. The
score is the average absolute deviation between desired production and
production capacity over the length of the game. Thus the score indicates how
well the player has balanced supply and demand. Players are penalized equally
for both excess demand and excess supply. The scoring rule supplies the loss
function which shapes the preferences of the players.5
The games reported below were initialized in equilibrium with orders of
450 units each period from the goods sector and capital stock of 500 units.
The capital sector must then order 50 units per period to replace deprecia-
15
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tion. Desired production then equals 450 + 50 units, exactly equal to
capacity, and yielding an initial score of zero.
Results
Several typical games are plotted in Figure 4; the results of 50 games
are summarized in Table 1. The sample includes MIT undergraduate, master's,
and doctoral students; PhD scientists and economists from various institutions
in the US, Europe, and the Soviet Union; and business executives including
several presidents and CEO's.6 In all the games, orders for capital from the
goods sector rise from 450 to 500 in year 4, and remain at 500 thereafter.
The step change in orders is not announced to the players in advance.
Consider figure 4g. The player reacts aggressively to the increase in
demand by ordering 150 units in year 4. The increase in orders further boosts
desired production, leading the player to order still more. Because capacity
is inadequate to meet the higher level of demand, unfilled orders accumulate
in the backlog, boosting desired production to a peak of 1590 units in year
12, and slowing the growth of capacity. The fraction of demand satisfied
drops to as low as 52%, so the player receives less than expected. Faced with
high and rising demand, the player's orders reach 500 in the tenth year.
Between years 14 and 16, capacity overtakes demand. Desired production then
falls precipitously as the backlog of the capital sector is depleted, opening
a large margin of excess capacity. Because of unfilled orders in the backlog,
capacity continues to rise until year 18, reaching over 1600 units. Note that
the step increase in goods sector orders raises total demand for capital by
just 10 percent, but capacity reaches a peak more than 300 percent greater
than its long-run equilibrium level. Faced with excess capacity, the player
cuts orders back to zero. Capacity then declines through discards for the
next 24 years. Significantly, the player allows capacity to undershoot its
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equilibrium value, initiating a second cycle of similar amplitude and
duration. The other games shown in Figure 4 are much the same. The specifics
vary, but the pattern of behavior in the games is remarkably similar. As
shown in Table 1, the vast majority of players generate significant
oscillations. The equilibrium value of capital stock is 560 units. The mean
peak value of capacity was 2200, nearly 4 times the equilibrium level. The
mean periodicity of the cycle is 45 years.
The oscillatory behavior seen in the majority of games is far from
optimal. The optimal path (Figure 5) assumes that the shock is unanticipated:
orders remain at their initial equilibrium level until after the rise in goods
sector orders. Because capacity can only increase with a lag, the sudden
increase in demand means the backlog of unfilled orders must rise above its
equilibrium value. Thus capacity must rise above equilibrium to work off that
excess backdog. After the backlog is reduced, capacity can fall back to the
equilibrium value. In the optimal pattern, orders rise sharply immediately
after the shock to boost capital stock above equilibrium and reduce the excess
backlog. Unlike most actual games, the resulting rise in desired production
does not cause further increases in orders. Instead, orders immediately drop
below the replacement level, allowing capacity to fall back to the equilibrium
level as the backlog of unfilled orders is filled. The optimal score is 19,
thirty-one times less than the mean and 4.5 times less than the minimum score
achieved in the sample of actual first-time players. Equilibrium is
reestablished just 5 periods after the shock. In contrast, only 8 percent of
the players were able to reach equilibrium within the 70 year time horizon of
the game, even though there is no additional disturbance to the system after
the initial shock, and it rapidly becomes clear that the goods sector will
continue to order 500 units.
7_·_(1·_1________1_1ICIII-.-Y·--II 
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Comparing the simulation model with experimental results
To facilitate computation during the experiment, there are a few
differences in parameters between the experiment and the original model (Note
4). To ensure that these differences do not produce spurious results the
parameters of the model were altered to correspond exactly to the experiment.
The behavior generated by the original simulation model, modified model, and
the experiment is strikingly similar (Table 2, Figure 6). In all three cases,
1. Output rises slowly due to the lags in acquiring capital, but falls
precipitously, followed by a long depression while the excess capital
depreciates.
2. Capacity peaks after and higher than production.
3. Delivery delay peaks before the peak of output (the fraction of demand
satisfied reaches its minimum before the peak of output).
4. Successive cycles occur despite the fact that there is no external
disturbance after the initial step increase in orders.
The correspondence between the simulations and experimental results is
excellent. The experiment shows that people do not behave rationally or
optimally even when perfect knowledge of the system structure and perfect
information are available, and even though the environment is highly simpli-
fied compared to real-life management situations. Indeed, players make basic
errors such as ignoring the amount of capital on order, failing to anticipate
the lag in acquiring capital, failing to realize that they will not receive
everything they order within one period when the fraction of demand satisfied
is less than one, and failing to anticipate the increase in the apparent
demand caused by their own orders. Interestingly, few players exercised their
option to plot out the behavior of the variables during the game.
The primary difference between the model and the experimental results is
the fact that many of the players began to learn how to control the system as
the game progressed. The mean capacity peak for the second cycle is "only"
18
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1130 compared to 2200 for the first peak. The original model on the other
hand presumes no learning, and generates a limit cycle that reaches a constant
amplitude and persists without continuous exogenous triggering (Figure 1). It
may seem that the diminishing amplitude of the cycles in the experiment
reflects learning on the part of players. But this is not necessarily true.
Note that the amplitude of the cycle in the game version of the model
diminishes over time even though there is no learning process in the
model (Figure 6). The parameters in the modified model result in a lightly
damped cycle while those of the original model cause a limit cycle.7
Learning, however, does occur. It typically requires several plays of
the basic game (with the single step increase in goods sector orders) for
people to learn how to avoid the large amplitude cycles typical in their first
play. And when the pattern of goods sector orders is changed, say by the
inclusion of a small amount of random noise, the performance of the players
deteriorates markedly; repeated play then brings the score down again. Players
rapidly learn how to do better in the basic game, but an appreciation for the
structure of the system and a robust ordering policy evolve more slowly.
Is the experiment a fair test?
One might argue that the experiment, while perhaps interesting, does not
reveal anything about investment behavior in the real world. The time
available for play is too short, the problem too simplified. Further, real
managers have access to decision aids such as corporate staffs, management
information systems, and sophisticated models of the economy. This issue
cannot be settled without further experimentation, but the parameters of the
problem can be estimated (generalizing from experimental to field settings is
discussed in Locke 1986). Investment decisions in the game are made in less
time than is available for real investment decisions. But the decisionmaking
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task is much simpler than that for any actual investment, and the information
available far more complete. These two effects offset each other. The issue
is whether the time available for decisionmaking in the experiment is long
enough with respect to the difficulty of the task. The experiment would not
be very illuminating if the results were contingent upon speeding players
through so fast that their short-term memory was overloaded, causing them to
make errors they would not make if they had more time to reflect. A rough
calculation suggests this not to be the case. First-time players typically
complete the 36 periods in about 40-80 minutes, implying about 70-130 seconds
per decision. There are eight pieces of information on the screen at any
given time. Short-term memory can store 7+2 chunks of information. It takes
about 5-10 seconds to transfer a chunk between short- and long-term memory.
70-130 seconds seems to be adequate time to scan and store the data and
manipulate it to produce an investment decision, even if subjects transfer
several pieces of data to long-term memory, particularly since not all
decisions take the same length of time. The first several require a long
time, as participants familiarize themselves with the game. Decisions when
capacity is inadequate also require relatively longer. But when capacity
vastly exceeds demand, players make their order decisions (usually to order 0)
quite rapidly, often in just a few seconds. Of particular significance here
is the fact that the experimental protocol does not impose any overt time
pressure on the participants--they proceed at their own pace.
Why does the model work?
Why does the model, with its highly aggregate, simplified representation
of decisionmaking, correspond so well to the behavior of real players? Why
does such a gross description of decisionmaking work at all? The task in the
game is a member of the large family of stock management control problems. In
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such a problem, the decisionmaker strives to adjust some stock to a desired
level, and to compensate for disturbances in the environment. Often there are
lags in the response of the stock to control actions. In the game, the
decisionmaker must adjust the level of capital toward some desired level and
keep it there once the desired level is attained, taking into account the fact
that capital depreciates and that there is a lag in acquiring new capital.
The ordering rule in the model says simply "order enough to replace
depreciation, modified by some fraction of the discrepancy between the desired
and actual levels of capacity, and don't forget to take the supply line of
previous orders into account." It includes obvious nonlinearities to prevent
negative or infinite orders. Any heuristic for managing a stock must take
these motivations into account or fail in an obviously irrational manner. A
decision rule that failed to replace the expected loss from the stock would
produce steady state error in which the actual quantity would always be
insufficient. A rule that failed to compensate for discrepancies between the
desired and actual values of the stock could not respond to a change in the
desired level of the stock and would allow the stock to drift randomly in
response to environmental disturbances. The replacement and stock adjustment
motivations for ordering are essential. In addition, a rule that fails to
adjust for the supply line of capital on order will always overorder,
producing instability.9
The decision rule in the model works because it captures the essential
attributes of any reasonable stock-management procedure. No matter how
detailed or complex the actual decisionmaking procedure is, it must compensate
for depreciation and adjust for discrepancies between the desired and actual
stock. The excellent fit between the aggregate rule and the behavior of real
people reflects what Simon (1969) calls the near decomposability of the
system:
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...We knew a great deal about the gross physical and chemical
behavior of matter before we had a knowledge of molecules, a great
deal about molecular chemistry before we had an atomic theory, and a
great deal about atoms before we had any theory of elementary
particles....
This skyhook-skyscraper construction of science from the roof down
to the yet unconstructed foundations was possible because the
behavior of the system at each level depended on only a very
approximate, simplified, abstracted characterization of the system
at the level next beneath....
Artificial systems and adaptive systems have properties that make
them particularly susceptible to simulation via simplified
models....Resemblance in behavior of systems without identity of the
inner systems is particularly feasible if the aspects in which we
are interested arise out of the organization of the parts,
independently of all but a few properties of the individual
components (Simon 1969, 17).
In other words, it is the feedback structure of the system that determines its
behavior, not the details of the decision rules.
Caveats and conclusions
The experiment shows that the continuous, aggregate decision rules used
in behavioral simulation models can be excellent representations of real
behavior. But the results reported here do not validate the model. The
validity of the model is contingent on assumptions about both the
institutional structure and the decision rules used by actors in the system.
The experiment shows the behavior of human subjects is not significantly
different from the behavior of the decision rule for investment assumed in the
model. But it leaves the institutional assumptions untested.
The experimental method described here can be used to test these
institutional assumptions. Among the most important are the aggregation of
all capital-producing firms into a single sector under the control of the
player, and the perfect information thus made available. These assumptions
can be tested by re-designing the game for multiple players. In such a design
each player would order capital from a supplier and receive orders from
various customers. The individual players would be linked by an input/output
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matrix specifying interfirm transactions. But as in real life, an individual
player would not be able to distinguish final demand from orders caused by
transient stock adjustments or acceleration effects. A successful outcome
would help build confidence in the appropriateness and utility of the original
model. Failure to replicate would show the aggregation assumptions of the
original model to be flawed.
The experimental method described here thus provides a process for
building confidence in models where primary data on decisionmaking behavior
are unavailable and significant aggregation is inevitable. It offers a useful
tool for reproducible testing of hypotheses about institutional structure and
decisionmaking behavior. Further, the experimental method seems to offer a
promising approach toward building confidence in simulation models at all
levels. While the approach may be particularly useful in simulations of macro
systems where more usual research methods are not feasible, it should be
useful in models of smaller organizations as well.
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NOTES
1. Nelson and Winter 1982 provide a notable exception based on bounded
rationality.
2. See e.g. Holt et al. 1960, Forrester 1961, Mass 1975, and Lyneis 1980, for
models employing this or similar rules for production scheduling.
3. Experimental economics is closely related to simulation gaming. The
literature on participatory simulation games is large and diverse (for
surveys, see Horn and Cleaves 1980 and Wolfe 1985). Gaming in system
dynamics contexts includes the "Beer Game," a production-distribution
game (Sterman 1984), and STRATEGEM-1, an economic development game
(Meadows 1985). Unlike experimental economics, for the most part these
games are designed as teaching aids for the education of the players and
not as research tools.
4. There are minor differences in parameters between the two models to
facilitate computation in the game.
Parameter Original Experiment
COR Capital/Output Ratio (years) 3 2
CAT Capital Acquisition Time (years) 1.5 2
DT Computation Interval (years) small 2
In addition, all numbers are rounded in the experiment to the nearest 10
units. These differences substantially reduce the complexity of the
player's decisionmaking task without influencing the essential dynamics of
the game.
5. Average absolute deviation was used rather than quadratic or other
possible loss functions solely for simplicity. The experiment could
easily be replicated with alternative scoring rules to test robustness
with respect to this assumption.
6. No monetary rewards were used to motivate the players, in violation of
Smith's (1982a) protocol for experimental microeconomics. While the
experiment can be replicated with financial incentives, players in the
sample here reported that they took the game seriously and tried their
best. Particularly for the academic and business players, pride and fear
of embarrassment seemed to be strong motivators. Many players expressed
chagrin at their performance; some attempted to destroy their first
results and substitute later trials. It is important to debrief players
and explain the causes of the instability to convert the frustration of
playing into useful learning.
7. Sensitivity tests of the parameters are presented in Sterman 1985. The
parameters most influential for stability are the capital/output ratio COR
(eq. 9) and the stock adjustment parameters TAC and TAB (eq. 7 and 11).
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8. The existence of significant learning in the real economy is open to
question. The structure of the actual economy is far more complex, and
information far less available than in the experiment. Interconnections
among firms are not fully appreciated. Individual firms cannot
distinguish, as a player in the game can, the 'true' long-run demand from
the 'false' orders generated by transient stock-adjustments and
self-ordering. Note that the optimal behavior in the game demands that
investment fall dramatically just when demand is highest relative to
supply. Do real firms scale investment back just when backlogs are
bulging, demand growing, prices and profits high, and delivery schedules
stretching out? In addition, the long time required in real life for the
consequences of the accelerator to manifest reduces the likelihood that
corporate and government managers will learn from experience. Learning is
hindered by the low weight accorded to the record of past decades and the
advice of 'elder statesmen' compared to the memory of recent events and
the pressures of the moment. Note that the three-to-five games typically
required to learn how to bring the system smoothly into equilibrium in the
experiment corresponds to several hundred years of simulated personal
experience in a controlled environment.
9. In fact many players do forget to take the supply line into account,
exacerbating the instability (e.g. Figures 4a, 4b). The importance of the
supply line correction is tested in Sterman 1985.
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Figure 1. Limit cycle generated by original simulation model
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Figure 2. Structure of original simulation model.
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Figure 3. Game board, showing initial configuration.
Player is about to enter new orders for capital sector.
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Optimal behavior in the game.
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Figure 6. Behavior of modified model. Parameters of original model
modified to correspond exactly to the experiment.
Score 499 *. Desired Production
0. Production Capacity
I. New Orders from Capital Sector
Year
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68
I
36
s4 00 "
cv 0
0%
enMI
n '0 4n
- M%
,
Co N cu
I VV M
in ;
M0MI
%C & e MeIT e4
IV ~%C(4 -
0~~ .0 ~~.0I co 0 Dt Z: °° 00
n c
I a t I 2A.8 
D-3783 37
C 0
z 
ao v,
_- e
_I _C
aUw Rx
2
h
gj
0
00
0%
'0
0
0
4wEl
0
z
tt
0z
0I
v %
_ t
O O -o w c
.0 
o0 00
i1
!al.l
.5
S
*31
a
*1
.0t
*I
iis .5 ] *
tigt
255l.
iii'
Uc .0 t
0
021
9 .0
U-
a- iZ iM
I a
IX ---_ _-III_._.__
